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1. Introduction 
1.1 The findings of the research described in this paper 
are that there were significant errors made in the setting of 
water charges in 2002-06 in Scotland, such that there was 
substantial overcharging of customers. This will continue at 
a lesser extent over the period 2006-10. The amounts 
involved are large: total overcharging in cash terms is likely 
to be at least £650 million cumulatively over the eight year 
period from 2002 to 2010, and could well be close to £1 
billion. This affects both households and businesses in 
Scotland. 
 
1.2   Water charges in Scotland are determined through 
reviews carried out every four years. Charges for 2002-06 
arose from the Strategic Review of Charges 2002-06 
(SR2001), carried out in 2001 by the Water Industry 
Commissioner (WIC). In June 2005 the Draft Determination 
for 2006-10, (DD), was issued for consultation: final 
decisions on the basis of the DD were announced in 
November 2005: (ref: Final Determination). 
 
1.3   This paper is a follow up to an earlier paper
1 
in which 
we argued that there had been errors in the application of 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) control in 
SR2001 and that this had led to water customers in 
Scotland being over-charged. Our earlier paper was based 
on the very limited evidence available at that time about 
how the calculations underlying the application of the new 
RAB control regime for water in Scotland had actually been 
carried out. We had suggested that there were mistakes in 
the application of RAB control: because, in particular, 
although the implementation of the new control regime was 
meant to be neutral, in fact, the amount of borrowing 
available to the water industry under the new regime was 
clearly very restricted compared to the borrowing limits 
previously applied to the industry. We argued that the 
effect was likely to have been significant overcharging of 
water customers. 
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1.4   In this paper, we review the latest available evidence, 
including the detailed information published in the DD. We 
then consider the implications for water charges. The 
evidence confirms that very significant errors were indeed 
made in the application of RAB control to the water 
industry. The primary effect of these errors was to over- 
inflate the estimates of depreciation included in the 
strategic review calculations, while at the same time 
restricting the available room for manoeuvre within the 
public expenditure control limits in operation. The result is 
that there was substantial overcharging of water customers 
in the SR2001 period. 
 
1.5   The structure of the paper is as follows: 
 
• Section 2 outlines some relevant historical 
background. 
• Section 3 sets out, in the light of the latest 
available evidence, a record of errors and 
unresolved issues concerning SR2001. 
• Section 4 briefly outlines the methodology 
adopted in the DD, and considers the implications 
of SR2001 for the revenue caps proposed in the 
DD. 
• Section 5 gives a summary of our findings, and 
sets out conclusions. 
 
1.6   As noted above, the final determination of water 
charges for 2006-10 was announced before this paper was 
submitted for publication. This paper has been drafted, 
however, in relation to the draft determination rather than 
the final determination figures, for two reasons:- 
 
a) the primary reason is that, in respect of the key 
variables which bear on the argument of this 
paper, (namely, investment, depreciation and 
borrowing), the final determination figures differ 
only marginally from the draft determination: so 
our conclusions are independent of whether the 
draft or final determination figures are used. 
 
b) in addition, supporting background figures are 
available in much more detail for the draft 
determination than for the final determination: so 
there is an important advantage in terms of 
internal consistency in using the draft 
determination figures throughout. 
 
2. Some historical background 
2.1   As noted in the introduction, this paper is a follow up to 
our paper, Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2003), which was 
published in December 2003. In November 2003, we had 
provided a pre-publication draft of that paper to the Finance 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament. The Finance 
Committee took oral evidence from ourselves, the WIC, 
and the responsible Scottish Executive Minister and 
officials. 
2.2   In their evidence, both the WIC and the Scottish 
Executive stated that there had been no error in the 
application of RAB control, or any resulting overcharging. 
The Finance Committee itself split on this topic: a majority 
agreed with the Scottish Executive, but three members 
published a minority report: (Finance Committee 2004: (a) 
and (b)) The minority report held that there had been 
substantive errors, both in the way RAB control had been 
applied, and in the calculation of a key financial ratio, the 
interest cover ratio: as a result, there had been substantial 
overcharging of water consumers, probably by some 
£300m cumulatively over the strategic review period. Both 
the majority and minority reports of the Finance Committee 
can be accessed on the Water Customer Panel website. 
The evidence of the WIC, ourselves, and the Scottish 
Executive can be accessed on the Finance Committee 
website: see the proceedings of the meetings of 2
nd
 
December 2003, 27
th 
January 2004, and 3
rd 
February 2004 
respectively. 
 
2.3   With one exception, it is not our intention to reprise 
the arguments surrounding the Finance Committee 
hearings, since these arguments have to a large extent 
been overtaken by later evidence, such as the publication 
of Scottish Water accounts up to 2004-05, the publication 
of the ONS technical note (ONS 2005), and the information 
contained in the Draft Determination. It is this later 
evidence which is discussed in detail in the present paper. 
 
2.4   The single exception, is a piece of evidence which the 
Scottish Executive provided to the Finance Committee, in 
the form of a letter from the Treasury, containing the 
following quotation: 
 
“As far as we are aware, the  Scottish Executive 
have adopted the normal accounting treatment”: 
(Letter from Mark Parkinson, HM Treasury, dated 
24
th 
February 2004 to David Reid, Scottish 
Executive, about the Scottish Executive’s handling of 
Scottish Water.) 
 
This Treasury letter appears, at first sight, to endorse the 
approach adopted by the Scottish Executive towards the 
financial control of Scottish Water under the RAB system. 
 
2.5   Subsequent to receipt of a copy of the Treasury letter, 
we engaged in correspondence with the Treasury to clarify 
the precise meaning of their letter. This was a difficult 
process which took several months, but we eventually 
established that the Treasury comment related to the way 
in which Scottish Water’s expenditure is reflected in the 
Scottish Budget, that is, in its accounting to the Treasury. 
This is a matter which was never at issue. The point which 
was at issue concerned the form of financial control 
exercised over Scottish Water by the Scottish Executive. 
The final letter from the Treasury, (letter from Conrad 
Smewing, 2005, which can be accessed under the Finance 
Committee papers for their meeting of 28
th 
June 2005), 
makes clear that the Treasury have no locus to comment 
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on this aspect: the original letter in fact provides no 
endorsement of the Scottish Executive approach. 
 
3. Errors in the strategic review of charges 2002- 
2006 
3.1   When we wrote our earlier paper, only partial 
information was in the public domain about how RAB had 
been applied to the water industry. Following the 
publication of that paper, much more information has 
emerged about how the RAB control limits were set and 
how SR2001 was carried out. This section sets out, in the 
light of the latest available information, a record of errors 
RAB expenditure = operating expenditure + investment + 
depreciation + capital charge element
4 
– revenue (1) 
 
The problem for the WIC, in carrying out the strategic 
review, was to model the financial operation of the water 
industry so as to achieve reasonable and feasible values 
for each of the terms on the right hand side of this 
equation, subject to the constraint that the overall value for 
RAB expenditure given by formula (1) had to fall within the 
RAB limit specified by the Scottish Executive, (and allowing 
a reasonable safety margin for contingencies). 
and unresolved issues in SR2001. These are: 3.4   The water industry has a considerable stock of capital 
assets which are depreciated by conventional methods. 
• Inconsistency in the treatment of depreciation of 
non-infrastructure assets in setting and applying 
the RAB limit. 
• Error in the expensing of infrastructure renewal 
balances. 
• Error in the calculation of infrastructure renewal 
expenditure. 
• Double counting of infrastructure renewal 
expenditure in the RAB limit. 
• Choice of accounting treatment for infrastructure 
renewal expenditure. 
• Error in the calculation of a key financial ratio, the 
Interest Cover Ratio 
 
3.2   As a public corporation, Scottish Water can borrow 
only from government. In 2001, in line with the general 
introduction of RAB, the government replaced the former 
borrowing limit for the water industry in Scotland by a 
control measure based on RAB. Essentially, RAB allows 
non-cash items such as depreciation to be brought into 
consideration. The government abandoned RAB control on 
water in 2003, returning to control on borrowing: but, 
crucially, during the period when SR2001 was being 
carried out, the financial control on the water industry was 
by means of the RAB limit. This is of key importance 
because it was the decisions on revenue caps made during 
this period which determined charges up to 2006. 
 
3.3   In addition to setting a lower limit on profits, in SR2001 
a combined control on capital investment and profits was 
set for water in Scotland
2
: namely, capital expenditure had 
not to exceed a capital budget made up of a fixed amount 
plus profit. This fixed amount was referred to in Annex A to 
Allan Wilson’s letter (Feb2004) as the 
“RAB resource allocation for the year”, which we will simply 
call the limit on RAB expenditure or RAB limit. Note that 
this approach to RAB control, of setting a limit which 
combines capital investment and profits, is a non-standard 
approach to RAB: the standard RAB approach is to set 
separate limits on capital and profits. 
 
It is known exactly how the RAB resource allocation was 
calculated.
3 
In particular, (see SR2001, Tables 32.1 to 
32.6), RAB expenditure was calculated as 
However, the water industry shares with the road network 
the characteristic that a significant part of its capital assets 
consists of long lived network type assets, which it is 
difficult to handle by conventional book value depreciation 
methods. Instead, expenditure on keeping the network at a 
constant level of functionality is used as a proxy for the 
formal depreciation of the asset. For the water industry this 
is known as infrastructure renewal. What is actually spent 
on infrastructure renewal is called infrastructure renewal 
expenditure (IRE), and what is charged to the Income and 
Expenditure statement is the infrastructure renewal charge 
(IRC). The IRC may differ from the IRE: for example, if in 
the past an element of IRE has been financed by borrowing 
rather than from revenue, then it may be desired to recoup 
this element from current revenue, by charging more to the 
Income and Expenditure account (as IRC) than is currently 
being spent as IRE. As will be seen later, this kind of 
adjustment was made in SR2001: for each of the years of 
the strategic review period, the relationship between IRC 
and IRE was: 
 
IRC= IRE + £43.2m. 
 
This £43.2m term is referred to in SR2001 as “expensing of 
infrastructure balances”. Thus, cumulatively, over the four 
year period of the review, IRC was £172.8m greater than 
IRE. 
 
The “depreciation” term in formula (1) consists of the sum 
of conventional depreciation of non-infrastructure assets 
plus the IRC. 
 
3.5   It can be seen from formula(1) that if depreciation 
increases after the RAB limit has been set, and if there is 
no room to squeeze operating expenditure or investment, 
then either revenue will need to rise, or the RAB limit will 
be breached. It is therefore important to examine in detail 
the depreciation figures assumed in SR2001. 
 
3.6   The following table sets out the components of 
depreciation actually assumed in SR2001. 
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Depreciation Figures from SR2001 £ million cash terms 
 
  
2002/03 
 
2003/04 
 
2004/05 
 
2005/06 
 
Total 
 
Depreciation of non-infrastructure assets 
 
133.5 
 
161.7 
 
173.3 
 
173.8 
 
642.3 
 
IRC: expensing balances component 
 
43.2 
 
43.2 
 
43.2 
 
43.2 
 
172.8 
 
IRC: IRE component 
 
83.8 
 
80.1 
 
140.3 
 
147.7 
 
451.9 
Total Depreciation 260.5 285.0 356.8 364.7 1,267 
 
Source: SR2001 table 32.2 and page 404 
     
 
Note that the Scottish Executive effectively set a constant 
baseline RAB limit throughout the SR2001 period: see, for 
example, SR Table 32.6. When the original RAB limit was 
set, the Scottish Executive had assumed an annual 
allowance for depreciation of £202m (Allan Wilson 2004), 
that is, £808m over the four year period. 
The amount assumed in SR2001 for depreciation is 
therefore some (£1,267m -£808m) that is, £459m more, 
cumulatively, than was assumed by the Scottish Executive 
in setting the RAB limits. 
 
3.7   For reasons which will become apparent later, it is 
important to split this increase of £459m into components 
relating to the different types of depreciation. This can be 
done as follows: 
 
Given that the audited actual IRE for the water industry in 
2000-01 was £81.6m, and that the WIC assumed IRE of 
£83.79m and £80.06m for the first two years of the 
strategic review period, (SR2001 p404), it seems 
reasonable to assume that approximately £80m of the 
Scottish Executive’s annual depreciation figure of £202m 
would relate to IRE, that is, £320m over the four year 
period, leaving £122m per annum, that is, £488m in total, 
as non-infrastructure depreciation. Hence: 
 
 
Calculation  of Increase in Depreciation  in the Strategic  Review Relative to Level Assumed by Scottish Executive in Setting RAB 
Limits: Cumulative  Figures over Period 2002-06. £ million cash terms 
 
 
 
SR2001 Scottish Exec. Baseline Increase 
Depreciation:non-infrastructure assets 642.3 488 154.3 
Expensing infrastructure renewal balances  172.8 0 172.8 
 
 
IRE 451.9 320 131.9 
Total 1,267 808 459 
 
 
 
3.8   Having established this background, we now consider 
in turn each of the errors and unresolved issues in the 
strategic review referred to in paragraph 3.1 
 
Inconsistency in the treatment of depreciation of non- 
infrastructure assets in setting and applying the RAB 
limit 
3.9   The outturn figures for the depreciation of non- 
infrastructure assets published in the accounts of Scottish 
Water are respectively £105.1m, £119m, and £114.5m for 
the years 2002-03 up to 2004-05. These figures are 
explicitly stated in the accounts as being on the historic 
cost basis for calculating depreciation. Moreover, in 
calculating the outturn of RAB expenditure against the RAB 
limit on page 53 of its accounts for 2002-03, it is the figure 
of £105.1m which is used by Scottish Water. Similarly, the 
Scottish Executive has used historic cost depreciation in 
publishing its figures for the outturn against the RAB limit: 
(see Scottish Executive 2004 for outturn figures). It is clear 
from the figures that historic cost depreciation was used by 
the Scottish Executive both in setting the RAB limit and in 
calculating outturn against that limit. 
 
However, in setting the revenue caps in SR2001, the WIC 
did not use straight forward historic cost depreciation, but 
instead used what he termed a “modified historic cost 
basis”, under which depreciation is calculated on the 
original price of assets uprated by the Construction 
Operators’ Price Index, or COPI: (SR2001, page 101). 
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The depreciation basis used in SR2001 might be regarded 
as a form of current cost depreciation - which results in 
figures significantly higher than historic cost depreciation. It 
seems likely that this accounts for a large part of the 
£154.3m increase in non- infrastructure depreciation 
relative to the values used when the RAB limit was set. 
 
3.10   In summary, therefore, the RAB limit was set by the 
Scottish Executive using historic cost depreciation: a form 
of current cost depreciation was used in SR2001 
calculations but without any modification to the original 
RAB limit: and when the Scottish Executive calculated 
outturn against the RAB limit it went back to using historic 
cost. This inconsistency is a clear error in the conduct of 
the strategic review. In effect, because of this error, a given 
amount of public expenditure would go further for the 
Scottish Executive in its budget than it would for the WIC in 
his strategic review calculations. 
 
This might explain a puzzling aspect of water finance over 
the period covered by the strategic review: namely, that the 
Scottish Executive was able to transfer significant amounts 
of public expenditure  out of the funds allocated for water in 
its budget, even though the WIC stated in the strategic 
review that he would use up all of the available public 
expenditure. 
 
Further, if the RAB limit had been adjusted for the changed 
basis of depreciation actually used in SR2001, then the 
WIC would have had an extra £150m available within his 
public expenditure constraint. Thus the WIC could have 
lowered his revenue caps by £150m while still maintaining 
the same public expenditure contingency margin that he 
felt was required. 
 
Error in the expensing of infrastructure renewal 
balances 
3.11 As regards the “expensing of infrastructure 
renewal balances”, this kind of adjustment is introduced 
where there is a wish to recoup from water charges any 
past IRE which may have been financed by borrowing 
rather than revenue. The justification given for this in 
SR2001 is the following quotation 
 
“I have expensed any infrastructure balances as 
at 1
st 
April 2001 through the Income and 
Expenditure Account: I have done this over 10 
years to eliminate the balances gradually”: 
(SR2001 page 101). 
 
This falls far short of the detailed justification for such an 
enhancement that OFWAT would require from an English 
water authority.
5
 
 
Moreover, as we have seen, the WIC intended this 
adjustment to apply over a 10 year period up to 2011. 
However, this component of depreciation has been 
abandoned in the DD, apparently without any comment. 
On both of these grounds, the inclusion of the “expensing 
of balances” element of £172.8m in SR2001 appears to be 
an error. 
 
Error in the calculation of infrastructure renewal 
expenditure 
3.12   On page 86 of the DD Executive Summary it is 
stated that 
 
“We analysed the infrastructure renewals charges of 
the companies south of the Border relative to the assets 
and customers served. This analysis would suggest 
that the total infrastructure renewal charge (IRC) for 
Scottish Water in 2003-04 should have been in the 
range £45 million to £75 million. Its actual IRC in 2003- 
04 was £143 million.” 
 
(Note that the £143m referred to in this quotation is from 
the published accounts of Scottish Water). In the light of 
this, far from increasing by £131.9m the IRE figure 
assumed by the Scottish Executive, the WIC should have 
been reducing it: on the basis of our estimates, (made in 
the light of the above quotation from the DD), we estimate 
that the IRE used in SR2001 was too high by a cumulative 
total of £180 million over the four year period of the review. 
 
Double Counting of Infrastructure Renewal 
Expenditure in the RAB Limit 
3.13   A further distortion to water charges arises because 
IRE is double counted in formula (1). That double counting 
of IRE does indeed take place is established in Annex 1. 
The consequence of the double counting of IRE in formula 
(1) is that unduly high water charges will result if IRE is 
increased after the RAB limit has been set: the algebra 
underlying this effect is set out in Annex 2. 
 
3.14   Given that, as can be seen from the table in para 
3.7, IRE increased by a cumulative total of £131.9m after 
the RAB limit had been set, (and, in the light of paragraph 
3.12, by £180 million relative to what it should have been), 
the double counting error will indeed have had a significant 
impact on water charges. 
 
Choice of Accounting Treatment for Infrastructure 
Renewal Expenditure 
3.15   A recent ONS publication (ONS 2005), throws light 
on how the double counting error arose. The ONS note 
sets out two ways of accounting for infrastructure renewal 
type expenditure: these are denoted the “renewals” and 
“depreciation” approaches. If IRE is accounted for under 
the “renewals” approach, it is not double counted in 
formula(1) above: but if it is accounted for under the 
“depreciation” approach then it is double counted. It is 
clear, both from SR2001 and Annex A to Allan Wilson’s 
letter of 24
th 
February, that the approach adopted for 
infrastructure renewal expenditure in the Scottish water 
industry is indeed, in the ONS terminology, the 
“depreciation” approach. 
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3.16   Interestingly, the Treasury do not appear to have 
issued any guidance to departments on which accounting 
approach should be used for infrastructure renewals type 
expenditure. Presumably this is because, under the 
standard approach to RAB control, since separate limits 
are set for profit and capital expenditure, the double 
counting problem does not arise. The mistake made by the 
Scottish Executive was in combining a non-standard 
approach to RAB control, (which was not in itself wrong), 
with an inappropriate choice of accounting method for IRE. 
 
Error in the calculation of a key financial ratio, the 
Interest Cover Ratio 
3.17   In SR2001 page 63, the WIC writes “I have reviewed 
a number of financial ratios and have concluded that a ratio 
of free cash flow … to interest payable is the most 
appropriate.” This ratio is also referred to as the interest 
cover ratio. The WIC went on to state that “My review of the 
equivalent ratio in England and Wales would suggest that 
interest cover in Scotland is not as healthy as would be 
desirable.” 
 
In fact, the WIC made a fundamental error in the 
comparison of the ratios between Scotland and England. In 
producing the Scottish ratios in SR2001, the numerator of 
the ratio was calculated, incorrectly, as revenue - total cash 
outgoings + interest: this means that the WIC effectively 
used as numerator of the Scottish ratio:- 
 
Revenue - Operating Expenditure - Investment 
 
The following table shows the derivation of the numerator 
used in the review in calculating the Scottish interest cover 
ratio. 
 
 
Derivation of Free Cash Flow as used in Strategic Review: £ million cash terms 
 
 
 
2002/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
 
Revenue (A) 825.9 888.2 957.2 1000.9 988.3 
 
Total outgoings   1064.4  1038.4  1059.6  1047.2  982.5 
less Interest  142.7 150.6 153.8 154.9 152.9 
equals  Outgoings less interest (B)    921.7    887.4    905.8   892.3  829.6 
 
(A) - (B) equals Free Cash Flow -95.8 0.4 51.4 108.6 158.7 
 
 
 
 
 
All of the figures in the first three rows of this table are 
taken from SR Table 32.4. The last row in this table, (that 
is, revenue less all cash outgoings except interest 
payments), is equal to the figures for free cash flow given 
in Table 32.7. 
 
3.18   However, in calculating the interest cover ratio for 
England and Wales, (WIC, 2004), the WIC calculated the 
numerator of the ratio as 
 
Revenue - Operating Expenditure 
 
(This is one of the standard definitions used by OFWAT). 
This latter approach is much less stringent than the way 
the WIC had calculated the interest cover ratio for 
Scotland. 
 
3.19   The effect of this error was very significant. On the 
basis of his mistaken calculation, the WIC had estimated 
the interest cover ratio at -0.7  for Scotland in 2001-02: 
however, had he used the same definition  he used for 
England and Wales the ratio for Scotland would have been 
2.9, compared with a value of 1.5 for England and Wales. 
The fundamental importance of this mistake can be seen 
from the WIC’s appearance before the Finance Committee 
of the Scottish Parliament on 2
nd 
December 2003, (which 
occurred before we had identified the WIC’s error in 
calculating the interest cover ratio), where the WIC 
explicitly used the mistaken interest cover ratio figure for 
Scotland to justify the charging policy in SR2001. The WIC 
said: 
 
“We were trying to bring cash flow cover of interest 
payments to a ratio of 1”: 
 
and he brought in the English and Welsh comparison to 
justify this as a sensible goal. But as we have seen, if the 
figure for Scotland had been calculated on the same basis 
as England and Wales, it would have been immediately 
apparent that the ratio in Scotland was already well above 
1, and indeed well above the position in England and 
Wales. 
 
The Effect of the Errors 
3.20 It is worth taking stock here to assess what the 
probable impact of all of the above was in terms of 
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overcharging. On the basis of SR2001’s own arithmetic, 
investment was planned at £1,860m over the period 2002- 
06, and depreciation was estimated at £1,267m. On a 
normal view of prudence, and assuming the depreciation 
figure was justified, this would suggest that borrowing 
would be around (£1,860m - £1,267m), that is, £600m. 
However, the review itself predicted that borrowing would 
actually be £293m, (SR2001, table32.4), which is some 
£300m below the prudent level. 
 
In addition, as we have seen, at least £350m of the 
planned depreciation in the review looks unjustified: (this is 
the expensing balances error of £172.8m and the error in 
calculating IRE of £180m). A more reasonable estimate for 
depreciation, therefore, would be (£1,267m - £350m), that 
is, £917m. On the basis of this estimate, prudent borrowing 
could actually have been around (£1,860m - £917m), that 
is, about £950m: that is about £650m higher than the 
borrowing of £293m planned in SR2001. 
 
Of course, it cannot be assumed that all of this £650m 
represents overcharging for water: it is only sensible to 
allow a margin for contingencies, particularly as the WIC 
was looking for substantial efficiency savings whose 
delivery could not be regarded as certain. But even if a 
generous margin of £150m to £250m were allowed for 
contingencies, (which is consistent with the £220m margin 
in the strategic review), this still suggests, on a 
conservative estimate, that overcharging in SR2001 was in 
the probable range £400m to £500m or more. 
 
3.21   Is there other evidence to suggest that overcharging 
of this size actually took place? How could there be an 
elephant of this magnitude in the fridge without its 
footprints being obvious in the butter? We note here three 
relevant pieces of evidence which do indeed provide these 
footprints. 
 
(a)  First, there are other puzzling internal features of 
SR2001 itself: for example, how could it happen 
that the review foresaw the industry actually 
starting to repay debt by 2005-06 even though 
investment then was still running at a very high 
level. 
 
(b)  Second, there is evidence from the published 
accounts of the water industry, now available up 
to 2004-05. Total investment over the three year 
period 2002-05 has been around £1,275m: total 
depreciation has been £766.3m, (of which IRC 
was £428m): and total borrowing has been 
£188m. However, given the DD evidence quoted 
at para 3.12 above, a better estimate of IRC for 
the three years is £195m, thus giving a total 
depreciation estimate of £533.3m, rather than the 
£766.3m in the accounts. If the maximum prudent 
level of borrowing is taken as (Investment - 
Depreciation), prudent borrowing would equate to 
£741.7m over the three year period. Hence actual 
borrowing has been some £553.7m less than the 
level of borrowing which would normally be 
regarded as prudent. Note that this estimate is 
based on depreciation calculated on a historic 
cost basis: so it would be reduced somewhat if 
depreciation were moved on to a current cost 
basis. However, the effect of such a change would 
probably be no more than to reduce the figure of 
£553.7m by £150m: so there is firm outturn 
evidence of overcharging by £400m over these 
three years. 
 
(c)   During the period 2002-06, the Scottish Executive 
transferred out of the water budget to other parts 
of the Scottish Budget no less than £248m. 
(Midwinter, 2004). 
 
3.22   All of this evidence is consistent with our conclusion 
that water charges in Scotland have been seriously 
distorted over the strategic review period. 
 
4. The Draft Determination of Charges for 2006- 
10 
4.1   The Draft Determination of Charges, published in 
2005, set out proposed revenue caps for 2006-2010 for 
comment. The primary approach towards setting revenue 
caps in the DD is quite different from that adopted in 
SR2001. The basic approach is called the Regulatory 
Capital Value, (RCV), approach. A full definition of RCV is 
given in the DD: but for present purposes, it can be 
regarded as a notional assessment of an underlying capital 
value for the industry, increased each year by investment 
and inflation, and decreased by depreciation. The industry 
is required to operate so as to generate a cash return of 
4.6% on RCV. The total revenue required by the industry is 
then assessed in terms of the following formula: 
 
Revenue required = Allowed for Operating Costs + Allowed 
for PPP costs 
+ Depreciation + Infrastructure Renewal charge +Tax 
+ Cash Return on the RCV + Working Capital 
Adjustment. 
 
(Source: DD, Executive Summary, page 110) 
 
4.2   Leaving aside the small terms of tax and working 
capital adjustments, this formula implies that the required 
revenue should be set to cover operating expenditure (that 
is, allowed for operating costs and PPP costs), 
depreciation (of both non-infrastructure and infrastructure 
assets), and RCV return. 
 
In the previous section, it will be recalled that we took as a 
normal view of prudence for the industry that borrowing 
should equal (Investment - Depreciation): which is 
essentially equivalent to saying that revenue should cover 
operating expenditure, depreciation and interest charges. 
The RCV has been set in the DD at a level where the 
required cash return on RCV is of a similar magnitude to 
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interest payments. The implication is that the RCV 
approach should, in the short term, result in charges being 
set at about the same level as would result for an industry 
operating with normal prudence. 
 
4.3   In addition to the required revenue as calculated by 
the basic RCV method, the final revenue caps as 
recommended in the DD incorporate an element called a 
“financeability adjustment”: (FA). 
 
The calculated revenue, the FA, and the final total 
revenues are set out in the following table. 
 
Revenue Caps 2006-2010 £million cash terms 
 
 
 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Calculated  Revenue from basic RCV approach 852.9 916.2 974.5 1018.2 
 
 
Financeability Adjustment 129.7 89.3 34.7 0.0 
Total Revenue  982.7 1005.5 1009.2 1018.2 
 
 
 
Source: DD Table 7.10 
 
Relatively little is said in the DD about the logic of the 
financeability adjustment, although the statement “in line 
with Ministerial Guidance, we have smoothed the change 
in revenue” presumably refers to it. Note that, unlike a 
traditional form of smoothing, which might be expected to 
average to zero, all of its terms are positive: adding a total 
of £253.7 million over the four year period to the basic 
revenues coming out of the RCV approach. 
 
4.4   More light can be thrown on the Financeability 
Adjustment by considering Figure 1, which shows the 
proposed revenue from SR2001 (for years 2002-06), and 
the DD (for the years 2006-10). The chart also shows for 
the latter years, the revenue requirement from the basic 
RCV method, (so the difference between the two lines for 
2006-10 is the financeability adjustment). It can be seen 
clearly from the chart that the effect of the financeability 
adjustment is to lead smoothly from the 2005-06 revenue 
as determined in SR2001, to the 2009-10 revenue as 
determined by the basic RCV approach. 
 
4.5   If the financeability adjustment is indeed primarily 
designed to fulfil this smoothing function, then it represents 
a carry over into the DD period of the overcharging that has 
already been identified in the SR2001 period. In effect, if 
SR2001 had got it right in the first place there would have 
been no need for a tapering financeability adjustment in the 
DD period. The implications of this are very serious, given 
that, as we have seen, the financeability adjustment 
amounts cumulatively to some £253 million. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
5.1  In this paper, we have identified a number of errors 
and questionable aspects in the determination of water 
charges in Scotland for both of the periods 2002-06, and 
2006-10. These include: 
(a) the inconsistency in the basis of depreciation 
used in setting and applying the RAB limit in 
SR2001. 
(b) the error in the calculation of infrastructure 
renewal expenditure in SR2001. 
(c) the expensing infrastructure balances error in 
SR2001. 
(d) the double counting of infrastructure renewal 
expenditure in the RAB limit in SR2001. 
(e) the error in calculating a key financial ratio, 
the interest cover ratio, in SR2001. 
(f) the questionable basis of the financeability 
adjustment in the Draft Determination. 
 
5.2   To put these errors in context, consider the following 
estimates, based primarily on a combination of outturn 
figures for the period 2002-05, and planned figures from 
the Draft Determination thereafter. 
 
Over the eight year period 2002-10, 
investment =£4,208.6m 
depreciation (est. current cost basis and  including IRE) 
=£2,133.2m 
borrowing =£1,114.7m 
 
This gives an excess of investment over depreciation of 
£2,075.4m. This means that there is a gap of (£2,075.4m - 
£1,114.7m) = £960.7m of investment in net new capital 
assets which is being met from revenue. Given that the 
normal principles of equity and prudence suggest that 
today’s customers should not pay out of revenue to fund 
the creation of significant net new assets which will also be 
of benefit to future generations of customers, this gap of 
£960.7m needs to be explained and justified. 
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5.3 A number of the factors we have identified and 
quantified in this paper will contribute directly to this gap. 
These are set out in the following table. 
 
 
Failure to adjust RAB limit for inconsistency in basis of 
depreciation in SR2001 
£154.3m 
Error in Calculation of Infrastructure Renewal £180m 
Expensing Infrastructure Balances Error £172.8m 
Error in Double Counting IRE in the RAB Limit £180m 
DD Financeability Adjustment £253.7m 
Total £940.8m 
 
 
The total of these factors corresponds well to the gap 
identified in paragraph 5.2. 
 
5.4   The key question is: how many of the items in the 
above table is it justifiable to charge to revenue? In the 
table, the first four items, which sum to £687.1m, relate 
directly to errors: charging these items to revenue thus 
appears definitely unjustifiable. 
 
To this must be added an unknown element of the 
financeability adjustment which represents a carry-over of 
overcharging from SR2001, rather than relating to 
justifiable requirements of the Draft Determination. 
 
5.5   Given the above, our conclusion is that, over the 
period 2002-10, the revenues in the Strategic Review and 
the Draft Determination represent overcharging of at least 
£680 million and possibly approaching £1 billion. It has to 
be said that a final assessment of the exact scale of 
overcharging would require further work, looking at long 
term financial modelling of the industry, which goes beyond 
our present scope. Such further refinement, however, 
would not materially alter the scale of overcharging 
identified above. 
 
5.6   It will be apparent that overcharging of this scale will 
have had, and will continue to have, very adverse effects 
on private water customers, and on the competitiveness of 
Scottish business. The implication is that the issues in this 
paper need to be seriously and urgently addressed by the 
Water Commission, the Scottish Executive, and indeed, by 
bodies like Audit Scotland. 
 
5.7   On the basis of the calculations in the Draft 
Determination there would be £222m of public expenditure 
provision unused at the end of the DD period if the DD 
plans were fulfilled. Given this, it will clearly not be possible 
to redress overcharging of the scale identified above within 
existing public expenditure  provision. This then raises the 
question of how much public expenditure provision has 
been effectively lost to the water budget over the period, 
either by direct transfers out of the budget, or by downward 
adjustments of the future baseline. The published record 
on this question is obscure, but it is possible to come up 
with different estimates suggesting that the loss to the 
budget has been between £250m and £450m. It is a matter 
of great importance that the Scottish Executive clarify once 
and for all what has been lost to the water budget. 
 
5.8   Finally, once the immediate issues raised by this 
paper have been addressed, another question will come 
into sharper focus. The errors we have identified have had 
the effect of obscuring the level of public expenditure 
provision which the Scottish Executive requires to make by 
means of borrowing consents, to fund the prudent 
borrowing requirement of Scottish Water as long as it 
continues to be a public corporation. It is an oddity of the 
way Scottish Water is currently constituted that, although it 
in no sense receives any subsidy from the Scottish 
Executive, nevertheless, Scottish Water’s borrowing counts 
against the Scottish Executive’s public expenditure control 
limits: but because water is privatised in England, the 
Scottish Executive never receives any Barnett 
consequentials in relation to water. This means that any 
increase in Scottish Water’s required borrowing carries an 
opportunity cost, with public expenditure being diverted 
away from areas such as education, health, etc. 
There will be a requirement for a full debate to establish 
whether the longer term funding requirement for Scottish 
Water is likely to be able to be accommodated within the 
constraints of the Scottish budget. Even if the conclusion 
was that long term funding of Scottish Water does not look 
sustainable under present arrangements, there are viable 
alternatives, like the Welsh model, which fall short of full 
privatisation: this is fortunate, given that full privatisation 
could well remain unacceptable in Scotland. 
 
Annex 1: Double Counting of IRE in Formula (1): 
(see paragraph 3.13) 
1.   In this Annex we show that infrastructure renewal is 
counted twice in formula (1). We apologise to the reader for 
what might appear to be an excessive level of detail. 
However, given that this is an important point, which 
continues to be disputed by the Scottish Executive, we feel 
it is essential to give the reader an audit trail which can, if 
desired, be followed through in the actual tables of 
SR2001. 
 
2.   SR Table32.6 shows how RAB expenditure, (“resource 
accounting forecast total” in the table), builds up from its 
components: in terms of the notation used in that table: 
 
Resource Accounting Forecast Total 
=  Total Capital Investment Spend (line 2) 
+ Average Capital Charge Movement  (line 4) 
- Operating Profit (line 1). 
 
Further, the Operating Profit term can be derived from 
Tables 32.1 and 32.2 of the strategic review as follows: 
 
Operating Profit   = Total Revenue (line11 of T32.1) 
- Total Operating Cost (final line T32.2) 
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(This relationship holds to within £3 million for each of the 
years 2002-03 to 2005-06). 
 
Moreover, 
Total Operating Costs 
= Total Depreciation Charge (line 10 of T32.2) 
+ Operating Expenditure (line 1 of T32.4, or 
equivalently, the sum of all non-depreciation terms in 
T32.2). 
 
Hence, 
Resource Accounting Forecast Total  = Operating 
Expenditure + Total Capital Investment Spend (line 2 of 
T32.6) + Total Depreciation Charge (line 10 of T32.2) 
+ Capital Charge Element - Revenue. 
 
3.   We now show that IRE is a component both of total 
capital investment and total depreciation in this formula. 
 
a. Total capital investment spend   The 
components of this are shown in SR2001 
p404 and are the three items: IRE, quality 
related investment, and other investment. 
These sum to investment as in line 2 of Table 
32.6. Thus IRE is a component of investment. 
 
b. Total Depreciation Charge  From 
Table32.2, this equals non-infrastructure 
depreciation and IRC. Comparing IRC in 
Table 32.2 with the IRE figures on page 404, 
it can be seen that each year IRC is equal to 
IRE + a constant addition of £43.2m. Hence 
IRE is a component of the total depreciation 
charge. 
 
4.   Thus we have established that, since IRE is a 
component of both investment and depreciation in the 
SR2001 calculation of RAB expenditure, IRE is indeed 
double counted in formula (1). 
 
Annex 2: Effect on Charges of Increase in IRE after 
RAB Limit has been set: (see Paragraph 3.13) 
1.   If IRE does not change once the RAB limit has been 
set, then the double counting of IRE in formula (1) has no 
adverse effect on water charges. In this case, if the value X 
was assumed for IRE when the limit was set, then 
infrastructure renewal will contribute an amount 2X to the 
RAB limit: and if the outturn IRE is also X then 
infrastructure renewal will contribute the same amount, 2X, 
to the RAB expenditure to be set against the limit: there is 
therefore no squeeze on expenditure. 
 
2.   Now consider what happens if IRE changes after the 
RAB limit has been set. Suppose that  the RAB limit was 
set using formula(1) as 
 
RAB limit = O + I +D + C - R, 
where O, I, D, C, and R are planned operating expenditure, 
investment, depreciation, capital charge element, and 
revenue respectively. 
 
Now suppose that IRE increases by an amount δ over 
what was originally planned for: and that it is not feasible to 
squeeze operating expenditure or other elements of 
planned capital expenditure to accommodate this. Then the 
only option for keeping within the RAB limit is to increase 
revenue by an amount equal to twice the increase in IRE, 
as can be seen from the following: 
 
RAB expenditure = O+(I + δ )+(D+ δ )+ C-(R+2 δ )   = O + I 
+D +C- R = RAB limit 
 
Thus, the effect of the double counting of infrastructure 
renewal is to force the industry to raise charges by an 
amount 2 δ or it will breach its RAB limit. 
 
3.   Moreover, consider the effect on borrowing: suppose 
that the company had originally been planning to borrow 
what might reasonably be defined as a prudent amount: 
that is, (I - D). After the increase in infrastructure renewal, 
investment increases to (I + δ ) and depreciation increases 
to (D + δ ), so the prudent level of borrowing = (I + δ ) - (D + 
δ ) = I - D, and is therefore unchanged. But, as we have 
seen, the company has been forced to increase its revenue 
by 2 δ , whereas its actual cash outgoings have only 
increased by δ : so its borrowing will actually be (I - D - 
δ ), an amount δ below the “prudent” level. 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1 
Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2003 
2 
Commissioning Letter, 2001 
3 
A.Wilson 2004, and SR2001 
4 
this term is defined as “the increase in capital charge over 
the 2003/04 level”, where the capital charge is an assessed 
rate of return on the net asset value of Scottish Water. The 
capital charge element is, for the purposes of the strategic 
review, a relatively small element: the assessed values in 
SR2001 were 0, 0, £11.3m, and £21.1m for the years 
2002-03 to 2005-06 respectively. 
5 
See OFWAT 2003, paras.4.33 to 4.40 
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